Historically, this development takes the form of a backward shift from the issue of sanctions to their preconditions and prior powers. The initial point was the introduction of the sanctions; then -in the aftermath of the Haider affair -the issue shifted from sanctions to preventative measures at an earlier stage (the type of breach and the issue which institutions should have a say, and the desirability of a 'preventive mechanism'). The 'monitoring powers' which both logically and temporally precede the 'preventive mechanism' have become the focus of the most recent controversies over the 'Rule of Law Initiative' of the Commission, and over the Council's counter-initiative which steps even further back from 'monitoring' to a mere conversation within the Council. The structure of the analysis follows this retrograde development. This paper starts with a discussion of the sanctions and the procedures. It ends with a discussion of the Rule of Law initiatives of the Commission and Council respectively, asserting that these should more correctly be viewed as an integral part of the procedure under Article 7, rather than be situated outside it.
Article 7 TEU
Article 7 TEU concerns compliance with the values summed up in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which are common to the Member States and on which the Union is based. These are 'the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities', and the promotion of which is the aim of the Union (Article 3(1) and 13(1) TEU 1 ).
These values constitute, one may say, the constitutional identity of the Union in as far it coincides with the identity common to the Member States.
Hence, this provision is sometimes referred to as the 'homogeneity' clause, particularly in the German and Italian doctrine. 2 As the commonality of values is the very essence of what is to be protected, the duty on the part of the EU to respect the national identity inherent in the political and Historically, this is the core of the provision. Only with the Nice Treaty, the first paragraph of the present Article 7 was inserted, concerning a determination that there is 'a clear risk of a serious breach' by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. It was introduced in order to be able to monitor Member States and prevent the actual occurrence of a 'serious and persistent breach'. 4 So Article 7 has a three part structure:
1. the determination of 'a clear risk of a serious breach', 2. the determination of 'a serious and persistent breach' (which is not dependent on have a prior 'clear risk' determination) and 3. the decision to impose sanctions (which is dependent on a determination of a 'serious and persistent breach').
We discuss this procedure below, both as to its meaning and its procedural characteristics below. But true to the retrograde form of the analysis announced, we first discuss the sanctions and the procedure leading up to their imposition.
What sanctions?
Article 7(3) TEU is unclear as to the substance of the sanctions that can be imposed. These concern the suspension of 'certain rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question'. There is a surprising paucity in the literature as to what those 'certain rights' might be, except voting rights in the Council, as mentioned in Article 7(3). What other rights might be suspended other than voting rights must unavoidably be a matter of speculation.
What rights can and cannot be suspended?
The use of the expression 'certain' rights implies both that rights suspended are specified in the decision on the imposition of sanctions, and that not all rights can be suspended. Hence, Article 7(3) TEU excludes the possibility of suspension of membership or the ceasing of membership. It is up to a member who is target of sanctions whether to leave the Union or not -it cannot be compelled to leave. So even in the case in which a MS persistently refuses to better its life or restore its observance of the fundamental values of the EU, the EU cannot force it to leave. This is different under the counterpart of Article 7 TEU in the TEU's human rights sister, the Council of Europe's Statute, Article 8. This This provision was triggered after the colonels' coup in Greece by Max van der Stoel's reports on Greece to the Consultative Assembly, which led to the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe on 12 December 1969, before actual decisions under Article 8 of the Statute were taken. 7, 8 This experience suggests that a similar scenario might unroll in case of large scale sanctions under 7(3) TEU: should a Member State targeted by EU sanctions be unwilling to comply, it may well withdraw.
Could sanctions include such measures as were taken by the 14 Member State governments in February 2000, subsequent to Haider's FPÖ becoming a coalition partner in Austria at the end of 1999? These sanctions aimed at creating a cordon sanitaire around the Austrian coalition government, and took the form of bilateral diplomatic measures: the suspension of bilateral diplomatic contacts except on a 'technical level', freezing of bilateral contacts with other high officials , and no support for Austrian candidates 5 Article 3: 'Every Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council as specified in Chapter I.' 6 Statute of the Council of Europe, London 5 May 1949, ETS No. 1. 7 It is misleading if not wrong to say that Article 8 Statute CoE has never been activated, as is done in ; EU Commission in A New EU Framework for the Rule of Law, footnote 20 below, p. 6, footnote 17. 8 The 'Greek case' was brought by Denmark, Norway and Sweden, joined by the Netherlands to the European Commission of Human Rights; the Assembly found this procedure too burdensome and slow, given clear evidence that the Greek regime did not intend to restore democracy and the full enjoyment of human rights. Max Sørensen considered this a missed opportunity for building a human rights practice of the European Commission, but Max Van der Stoel found that awaiting the slow evidence gathering and procedure of the Commission to be counterproductive and called successfully for political intervention; see Theo van Boven, 'Human Rights: From Exclusion to Inclusion', Fons Coomans and others (eds.), Kluwer Deventer, 2000, 52-53. for positions in international organizations. 9 It would seem that these measures fall short of being a suspension of 'rights deriving from the application of the Treaties'. Rather they concern the benefits of diplomatic intercourse. Of course, the sanctions against Austria were not EC/EU sanctions, but bilateral sanctions of 14 Member States against Austria, and they were not supposed to interfere with obligations under European law. They might, however, be allowed as EU sanctions under the present Article 7(3) TEU to the extent that if the more is allowed -the suspension of rights -the less is also allowed -'suspension' of (nonrights related) factual benefits.
There is little other historical precedent on which one might rely in speculating on the nature of the sanctions under Article 7(3) TEU.
It is plausible that these type of sanctions taken under Article 7 against a Member State would justify the infringement of the principle of loyal cooperation and possible other infringements of EU law entailed on the part of the other Member States in the compliance and enforcement of the sanctions.
In principle sanctions could concern any 'right deriving from the application of the Treaties' to the Member State concerned. This implies that rights under secondary law can be suspended with regard to that Member State, secondary law being 'the application of the Treaties'. This is made explicit in the preamble to the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, which states: '(10) The mechanism of the European arrest warrant is based on a high level of confidence between Member States. Its implementation may be (1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union along with the observations submitted by the Member State in question shall be announced to Parliament and referred to the committee responsible in accordance with Rule 99. Except in urgent and justified circumstances, Parliament shall take its decision on a proposal from the committee responsible. 3. Decisions under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, constituting a majority of Parliament's component Members. 4. Subject to the authorisation of the Conference of Presidents, the committee responsible may submit an accompanying motion for a resolution. That motion for a resolution shall set out Parliament's views on a serious breach by a Member State, on the appropriate sanctions and on varying or revoking those sanctions. 5. The committee responsible shall ensure that Parliament is fully informed and, where necessary, asked for its views on all follow-up measures to its consent as given pursuant to paragraph 3. The Council shall be invited to outline developments as appropriate. On a proposal from the committee responsible, drawn up with the authorisation of the Conference of Presidents, Parliament may adopt recommendations to the Council. 
The preventive function of the first paragraph of Article 7
As we have already seen, the EU Treaty originally only provided for the determination of a serious and persistent breach and the imposition of sanctions by the Council. Imposing sanctions after the determination of a serious and persistent breach as only means to enforce compliance with the common constitutional values might be too great a step ever to be taken, and therefore impracticable. As Sadurski put it: the mechanism of Article 7 in its original form, was no more than a bark in practice. Or, one could say, a bite without a previous bark is not how it should be -except for really mean dogs. What was considered desirable was the creation of earlier and lesser intervention, since the existent power to impose sanctions could only be a last resort.
That was precisely why the Nice Treaty introduced the 'preventive mechanism' that we now find in Article 7(1): The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a Such a request must be made within one month from the date of such determination. The Court shall rule within one month from the date of the request.' determination was made continue to apply.
This provision intended to create powers for the EU to prevent the occurrence of an actual serious and persistent breach. So there is a certain relation between the preventive mechanism of paragraph 1 and the sanctions mechanism of paragraphs 2 and 3. Nevertheless, the preventative procedure under paragraph 1 is -for the very reason of being preventive in nature -considered to constitute a separate and different mechanism from the sanctions procedures under paragraphs 2 and 3. 18 Biting and barking are two different ways of responding to a rule of law crisis.
Part of the 'preventive mechanism' is the possibility of issuing recommendations to the relevant Member State. The formulation since Lisbon is different from the previous formulation: This suggests the competence of the Union prior to the risk determination.
Prior to Lisbon
A point of controversy has become the question whether paragraph 1 confers the power to monitor the situation in a Member State. The letter of the law suggests that such monitoring powers are explicitly granted to the Council after the determination of a 'serious risk'. But it has become controversial whether monitoring of Member States is allowed also prior to the determination of a 'serious risk'.
Given the fact that the decision-making in the Council will need a solid factual basis for the determination process, the logical assumption is that powers of monitoring are inherent in the powers of the Council and the right of initiative of the Parliament, Commission and Member States. This was also evident in the literature at the time. 19 The Commission explicitly adopted this view in its Communication on http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/brieven/2013/03/13/brief-aaneuropese-commissie-over-opzetten-rechtsstatelijkheidsmechanisme/brief-aan-europese-commissieover-opzetten-rechtsstatelijkheidsmechanisme.pdf, second page: 'Neither the procedures enshrined in the Treaties nor the EU fundamental rights charter provide for sufficiently targeted instruments. We therefore believe that a new and more effective mechanism to safeguard fundamental values in Member States is needed. Such a mechanism should be swift and independent of political expediency. We propose that the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties should have a stronger role here. It should be allowed to address deficits in a given country at an early stage and -if sufficiently supported by Member States -require the country in question to remedy the situation. A variety of options could then be explored to foster compliance, including introducing a structured political dialogue, bringing the issue to the Council at an early stage, or concluding binding agreements between the Commission and the relevant Member State. As a last resort, the suspension of EU funding should be possible. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effectivejustice/files/justice_scoreboard_2014_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effectivejustice/files/justice_scoreboard_2015_en.pdf. 29 This has in the meantime happened, and in some country specific recommendations in this framework, recommendations on the judicial systems have been made, e.g. the recommendations to Slovakia, which has many problems with the quality of the judiciary and has the lowest perceived judicial independence in Europe, see the report at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/cr2015_slovakia_en.pdf, p. 35-36. 30 The Commission has also begun publishing anti-corruption reports in 2013 and 2014, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-humantrafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm. The conclusion must be that for the Council to be able to use its powers under the 'preventive mechanism', there must be implied monitoring powers, which either the Council itself can use, or for which it can invoke the assistance of the Commission. Article 7 must be in order to remain within its boundaries.
Here, the Council Legal Service opinion perpetrates a rhetorical trick by changing 'monitoring' into 'supervision', thus suggesting the submission of the Member States to the Commission. It does so both with regard to the existing procedures of Article 7 and with regard to the Commission initiative. This language suggests an inherent inequality between the supervisory Commission and the subjected Member State involved, and plays on the sensitivity on the part of Member States of not being treated equally among themselves. It again invokes the mantra, repeated in many Council documents on the rule of law and Article 7, that any mechanism should be non-discriminatory and treat all Member States in the same way.
Hence, the Council initiative's stress on the peer review character of its own 'rule of law dialogue'. Indeed, the idea that it is other Member States that are conducting the dialogue instead of the Commission is to reinforce the 'peer' aspect of the review.
It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that monitoring and dialogue conducted by other institutions than the Council and its members is excluded. As we noted above, the framework of Article 7 is not merely literature and in the case law. 49 These views we need to develop slightly further in order to understand what the Council is doing when it attempts to set it aside in its new interpretation of Article 7.
In the standard account, the Union can act under Article 7 with regard to Member State acts that are not necessarily undertaken within the scope of EU law. This is precisely why an alleged infringement of the values of Article 2 is regarded as not being or not merely being the object of the ordinary infringement proceedings under Art. 258 and following of the TFEU: these are restricted to acts and omissions of Member States within the scope of EU law, whereas serious breaches of the values of Article 2 are not necessarily so. 50 In short, Article 7 can be considered a special State action within the scope of EU law properly speaking, is therefore a misconstruction. Otherwise, the situation could arise that a Member State respects human dignity, freedom, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and is a democracy only when it acts within the narrower confines of EU law, but can persistently and seriously breach those values and revile human dignity, stifle freedom, crush equality, deny the rule of law, trample human rights and act on the basis of dictatorship and gross denial of minority rights outside the scope of EU law narrowly understood. That would seem to be as untenable as improbable, given the entwining of the national and Union law in the practical exercise of public authority.
The conclusion must be that the values of Article 2, to the contrary, affect both the national and the Union's identity, with the consequence that, when threatened at the national level, these are threatened at the EU's level proceedings, and concluded to the inadmissibility of the relevant questions. 53 In Front Polisario, the General Court seemed to accept that Article 2 TEU is justiciable as standard for EU acts, but found that in the context of external economic relations the institutions enjoy a wide discretion that prevented the matter of the conclusion of an international agreement with application to an illegally occupied territory to regard the `founding values of the Union´. 54 
Concluding remarks
The 
